The study uses Social Identity Theory as a framework to explain how language acts as a source of social identity and motivates individuals to sort themselves by residential location. It establishes a theoretical model to illustrate that residential segregation is an outcome of a tradeoff between the externality benefits of identity and the cost of forgone capital gains in the housing market. Empirically, it assesses the extent to which housing price changes and the provision of language schools reinforce social identity and drive residential segregation. It uses census geographic data from Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver to conduct a comparative case study.
I. Introduction
Segregation by language in Canadian cities has persisted in the last decade. Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows the 1991-2001 changes in the dissimilarity index in urban Montreal by mother tongue, focusing on the Englishspeaking (Anglophone) and the French-speaking (Francophone) populations at the EA level. The figure shows that most EAs have seen little change in the dissimilarity index; as a summary measure, the dissimilarity index decreased minutely, from 0.59 to 0.58. Other large cities in Canada show a similar pattern. The case of Vancouver, for example, resembles that of Montreal; the dissimilarity index, based on the English-speaking and Chinese-speaking populations, dropped modestly, from 0. The above observation leads to the question: What is the role of language in influencing residential clustering/segregation? What might explain the different magnitude of residential segregation by language observed among the three major Canadian cities? This paper addresses these two questions. It argues that language is a source of social identity and motivates individuals to sort themselves by residential location-that is, residential segregation is an outcome of households' tradeoff between the externality benefits of identity and the cost of forgone capital gains in the housing market. The housing markets of Canadian cities have presented different opportunities in capital gains in the last 10 years, and provincial and local governments have employed different language policies. These differences imply that households in these cities have faced different degrees of tradeoff, giving rise to different degrees of residential segregation by language in these cities.
II. Social Identity Theory and Language Identity
This section will briefly review the conceptual framework of SIT. Social Identity Theory has wide applications. It has been used to study how organizational identity might affect individual performance at work (Ashforth and Mael, 1989) , national and group conflicts (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989) , national identity (Brown, Vivian and Hewston, 1999) , and religious affiliation (Deaux et al., 1995) . It is also applied in studies on gender identity (Gurin and Townsend, 1986 ) and cultural identity (Lickel et al., 2000) . Social Identity Theory has applications in the study of racism and discrimination (Tajfel, 1981) and prejudice (Bagby and Rector, 1992) . The present study applies the conceptual framework of SIT to residential segregation, using language as an attribute for defining social categories. It provides a basis for the subsequent theoretical and empirical models.
SIT principle: The categorization process Social Identity Theory offers a social-psychological perspective to explain how individuals categorize themselves and others and what mechanisms help to maintain these categories (Tajfel, 1966 (Tajfel, , 1969 Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1981) . It assumes that people, by nature, tend to mentally organize themselves and others into categories and that they derive a sense of "identity"-a sense of belonging-from the categories to which they belong. Social Identity Theory postulates that individuals follow a categorization process, identifying relevant attributes, using these attributes to define categories, and then locating themselves and others in these categories. In this way, individuals belonging to the same category exhibit identical or similar attributes; those belonging to different categories differ according to the identified attributes. It is from this similarity that group members derive a sense of social identity and belonging.
Application
The present study views language as an attribute that individuals use to define social categories and develop social identity. The study focuses on language because language is an important medium of communication; it is one of the most basic instruments for constructing individual experiences and facilitating group practices. Of particular relevance is the case of a multilingual society, wherein language often defines the availability of economic choices, possibility for career advances, and accessibility to opportunities politically, socially and economically. Individuals tend to use language to categorize themselves and others because language symbolizes history, culture, customs, traditions and tastes-experiences from which individuals derive commonality and a sense of familiarity and comradeship. It is from this sense of comradeship that individuals derive their social identity.
SIT principle: Mechanisms for group maintenance
Social Identity Theory posits that a social group maintains its identity and cohesiveness through situations that involve material or non-material (dis)incentives. These situations are (dis)enhancements, which may involve loss or suffering (Brown, 1986) , missed potential benefits (Tajfel, 1981) , task failure (Turner, 1981) or expected failure (Gammons, 1986) . Material and non-material incentives are self-enhancing mechanisms, providing favours to group members; these mechanisms retain members and exclude non-members.
Application
This study focuses on the geographic, economic and institutional enhancements for maintaining a language group's cohesiveness and social identity. It argues that individuals derive a greater sense of language identity-social identity derived from a common language-when the language group is large and is geographically clustered. Particularly, individuals from the same language group tend to live close to one another because of such factors as ease of communication, support, and access to language-specific goods and services that are costly to provide when members are few and are geographically dispersed. These factors include self-enhancements or favours to individuals who share a common language. They are positive externalities to group members-that is, that are benefits that even a less active group member can readily enjoy.
3 These positive externalities serve to encourage members to live close together and to retain members. Meanwhile, potential capital gains from housing elsewhere might have driven group members to move and diffuse and might have acted as disenhancements for group cohesion. The spatiality of language identity, in terms of residential location, is an outcome of the net gains derived from maintaining social identity in a spatial setting.
SIT principle: Implications for individual behaviour
The self-enhancing mechanisms have three implications for individual behaviour within a group. First, SIT implies that social identity is descriptive, prescriptive and evaluative. Social identity is descriptive because an identity is derived from the description of the attributes common to group members, prescriptive because membership often defines members' conduct and behaviour, evaluative because identity is a perception that is relational to other groups (or the out-group). Second, membership is often voluntary. A person will stay with a group when he/she can derive satisfaction from membership in the group; the person will switch to another group if switching will result in a higher level of satisfaction provided that the person is willing to bear the cost of switching. Third, implicit in the voluntary choice of membership is the assumption that no group exists alone. In fact, social categories are relational and are often competitive; therefore, the notion of social identity is meaningful only when the identity is in relation to, or in comparison with, other groups. Put differently, identity concerns not just one's identifying oneself as part of a group, but also how one is seen by others.
Application
In the context of SIT, language as a source of social identity draws two implications for individual behaviour in a language group. First, language is descriptive and prescriptive. Language is descriptive because it relates a person to his/her medium of communication and symbolizes his/her history, culture, traditions, customs and tastes. It is prescriptive because language itself represents a set of formal and informal rules for communication. The syntax, grammar and usage of a language constitute formal rules, explicitly defining how individuals communicate. Meanwhile, the fact that language symbolizes a person's experiences means that the context, undertone and expressions imply a set of informal norms and standards that only group members can understand and are expected to follow.
Second, membership in a language group is largely voluntary. In an aspatial context, voluntary membership implies that a person can choose to be proficient in another language, by assessing the net gain of switching to a different language on a daily basis. The gain could be due to benefits from career advancement or access to institutional information and services that are available in a specific language only. The cost could be the time and out-of-pocket expenses entailed in learning and switching to another language. Note that the fact that identity is relational means that even when a person switches to another language, he or she might be seen as a non-member of the other language group. When language identity is spatial, however, voluntary membership often implies mobility-that is, choosing proximity to language-specific facilities often involves a simultaneous choice of neighbourhood and residential location. Again, the fact that identity is relational implies that living among people who speak a different language does not mean that one is a member of that language group; however, it does signify that he/she may be giving up his/her previous identity to live as an out-group member. In sum, the fact that language identity is relational and voluntary implies that individuals are constantly assessing the net gain of being a (non)member of a language group; therefore, language identity is evaluative.
The above discussion produces a basis for developing a theoretical model and testing it empirically. The next section establishes a theoretical model to examine the spatiality of language identity, focusing on the residential choice of members from two language groups. Language is an attribute for defining social identity, identity being modelled as external benefits to in-group members residing in the same community, but external costs to out-group members if living among non-members. In essence, individuals weigh the gains of being an in-group member by staying in the same language group against the costs of losing one's identity as an outgroup member by living among a different language group. The spatial outcome of residential location reflects the net gain (cost) derived from maintaining social identity. The model is particularly useful for examining three questions:
1. Does group size matter to social identity, and if so to what extent? 2. Does geography matter to social identity in terms of clustering, and if so to what extent? 3. Does institution matter to social identity, and if so to what extent?
III. The theoretical model

The setup
The theoretical model is based on a game-theoretic setting, following the prototype model described by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) . It begins with a city with two communities or neighbourhoods that are separated by a river. The two communities differ in their naturally endowed amenities such that residents derive different levels of utility from living in them. Residents of the city make up two language groups and choose where they will live. When members of the same language group cluster and live in the same community, they derive a sense of identity from a common language. The sense of identity refers to the notion of self-enhancement in SIT and the notion of positive externality in economics. Positive externality increases with the size of the group at a decreasing rate-that is, the greater the size of the language group living in the same community, the greater the sense of language identity, plausibly through the lower cost of supporting language-based activities and amenities. When a person chooses to live among members of a different language group, he/she incurs a cost to him/herself in terms of a loss in identity. At the same time, the other language group bears a cost due to the presence of out-group members in the community. The cost occurs in the form of a negative externality, plausibly because of greater difficulty providing language-based activities at low cost. Negative externality increases at an increasing rate with the number of out-group members in the community. The outcome of the model is the distribution of the two language groups in the two communities. An extreme outcome would be complete segregation, with all members of a language group clustering in one community.
Specifically, let P 1 and P 2 denote typical members of the two language groups (L 1 and L 2 ) and C I and C II denote the two communities. The communities have an initial number of residents of N I and N II , respectively. (Throughout this section, subscript indicates the language type and superscript the community.) To fix ideas, consider the model under the standard formulation for utility maximization. Suppose identity does not matter such that no external benefits or costs are present. If P 1 lives in C I , he/she derives an indirect utility of V 1 I ; if P 1 lives in C II , the indirect utility is V 1 II . Similarly, if P 2 lives in C II (C I ), he/she obtains an indirect utility of V 2 II (V 2 I ). For ease of exposition, one can interpret the indirect utility V as the dwelling value capitalized on the natural amenities in the neighbourhood. In this case, P 1 (P 2 ) will assess V 1 I (V 2 I ) against V 1 II (V 2 II ), based on his/her taste for the amenities in C I and C
II
; both individuals will choose a community that gives a higher indirect utility. In a standard model of utility maximization, therefore, each person would live in a community corresponding to his/her preferences for the natural endowments in the communities.
Suppose individuals value language identity. Assume that the initial assignment of individuals to communities is random such that both communities have both types of individual-that is, N I (N II ) includes residents from both language groups, L 1 and L 2 . Without loss of generality, assume that C I has more residents speaking language L 1 and C II has more residents speaking language L 2 . The two individuals, P 1 and P 2 , observe the existing distribution of language groups and decide where to live. The presence of a minority language group in a community would incur an externality to the dominant group in the form of a loss in identity, by utility I o (n m ). Note that the notation o stands for "other" and n m refers to the size of the minority group; also, the notion of minority is relative to the other language group living in the same community.
Suppose I o ′(n m ) > 0 and I o ″(n m ) ≥ 0, meaning that the externality cost increases at a non-decreasing rate. To simplify, suppose I o (n m ) = o*n m , which is quasi-linear in n m such that the marginal externality cost is a constant o. Meanwhile, if a person is a minority in a community, he/she experiences a direct loss in self-identity, by I s (n m ). (The subscript s stands for "self.") Assume that I s ′(n m ) < 0 and I s ″(n m ) > 0, implying that the loss decreases at a non-decreasing rate as the size of the minority group increases. To simplify, assume that I o (n m ) = s/n m such that the marginal cost of identity loss diminishes by a magnitude of s/n m 2 . In sum, if P 1 lives in C I , P 1 has a utility of V 1 I − I o (n 2 I )-that is, P 1 encounters a loss in identity due to the externality cost associated with the presence of minority group L 2 in C I ; the size of the minority group is n 2 I . On the other hand, if P 1 chooses C II , P 1 receives a utility of V 1 II − I s (n 1 II )-that is, P 1 experiences a cost due to a loss in self-identity; the magnitude of this cost depends on the number of L 1 in C II , denoted by n 1 II . Likewise, if P 2 lives in C I , P 2 has a utility of V 2 I − I s (n 2 I ); if P 2 lives in C II , he/she has a utility of V 2 II − I o (n 1 II ). This model is represented as a normal-form game (Figure 2 ). The integers "1's" and "2's" in the expressions in Figure 2 denote the rate of change of the size of C I , C II , n 1 and n 2 . When N I and N II are large, these "1's" and "2's" become relatively negligible.
Analysis
The model has four possible equilibria, which are discussed in the following four cases. The first case is when P 1 lives in C I and P 2 in C II -that is, both P 1 and P 2 cluster with their majority. This happens when the following conditions hold: 
The first condition says, given that P 2 chooses C II , P 1 would choose C I when the gain in utility from living in C II is less than the net cost of identity, the net cost of identity being the self-identity cost of being a minority in C II less the externality cost due to the presence of L 2 in C I . Likewise, the second condition means, given that P 1 chooses C I , P 2 would choose C II when the gain in utility from living in C I is too low to compensate P 2 for the net cost of identity. Put differently, if self-identity is costly to the person and externality due to the presence of the out-group is relatively small, the model predicts that P 1 and P 2 would cluster with their in-group members.
A second case occurs when both P 1 and P 2 live in C
II
, a situation that is characterized by the following conditions: This case means that, given that P 2 chooses C II , P 1 would also choose C II when the net gain in utility from living in C II exceeds the net cost of identity. This could happen when some housing factors unrelated to identity drive V 1 II to be substantially higher than V 1 I . These factors might be due to the physical building or natural attributes C II , which drive P 1 to prefer dwellings in C II . A third equilibrium occurs when both P 1 and P 2 live in C I . This equilibrium happens when the following two conditions hold: 
The same interpretation applies: given that P 1 chooses C I , P 2 would choose C I when the net gain in utility from living in C I exceeds the net cost of identity. The final case is when P 1 chooses C II and P 2 lives in C I : This situation implies that individuals will disperse when the net cost of identity is small relative to the gain in indirect utility due to amenities unrelated to identity. Put differently, this happens when identity does not matter and individuals' residential locations tend to be driven by other housing factors.
The above four cases can be summarized succinctly into two points. First, the residential location is the outcome of a tradeoff between the net benefit due to the indirect utility V (such as property values) and the net cost due to the valuing of language identity. The net benefit arises from an individual's preference for the natural endowments of the two communities; the net cost compares the cost due to a loss in self-identity with the cost of externality due to the presence of the out-group. Consider P 1 , for example. V 1 II may be higher than V 1 I because of the initial random assignment such that P 1 prefers C II to C I based on natural amenities, transportation, the physical characteristics of the neighbourhood or the unique physical design of the property. Put differently, P 1 and P 2 may care about language identity but their residential location may also be driven by preferences based on factors unrelated to language identity. In particular, the greater the net benefit, the lesser the extent to which identity cost matters relatively. In this case, the model predicts that P 1 would be more likely to choose C II and that complete segregation is less likely to occur as a model outcome. On the other hand, the smaller the net gain in property value, the greater the extent to which identity matters relatively. In this case, the individual is more likely to cluster. Note that if V 1 I > V 1 II (V 2 II > V 2 I ) for P 1 (P 2 ), P 1 (P 2 ) would never choose C II (C I ) unless the externality cost exceeded the cost of self-identity. Second, assuming V 1 II > V 1 I > 0 and keeping the magnitude of the difference (V 1 II -V 1 I ) fixed, P 1 finds it desirable to live in C II when the direct cost due to the loss in self-identity is negligible compared to the cost of externality due to the presence of L 2 in C I . This condition applies either because s is small and o is large or because n 1 II has grown to a larger size in C II such that the marginal cost of self-identity becomes small. Put differently, viewing the model as a dynamic process, one can consider P 1 and P 2 as typical sequential newcomers. At some point when n 1 II has grown beyond a critical mass (which shall be examined shortly), the cost of self-identity becomes negligible. 
Complete segregation
Note that N II = n 1 II + n 2 II and that "(1)" refers to the fact that expression (9) is an outcome of P 1 's decision. If equality holds, expression (9) specifies an indifference condition for P 1 between C I and C
II
. P 1 would choose C I when n 2 I is less than the right-hand-side expression; he/she would choose C II when n 2 I exceeds the expression. Meanwhile, a similar condition exists for P 2 : The notation "(2)" refers to the fact that expression (10) is an outcome of P 2 's decision. Equality implies the indifference condition for P 2 ; if n 2 I is less than the right-hand-side expression, P 2 would choose C II ; if the reverse holds, P 2 would choose C I .
The comparative statics of the two indifference conditions in (9) and (10) are shown in . This expression means that when the cost of externality due to the presence of L 2 in C I becomes higher, P 1 is more likely to choose C II only if the gain in property value in C II is at least as great as the cost incurred due to a loss in self-identity. For P 2 , ( )
is strictly negative, a result implying that a higher externality cost would act as an incentive for P 2 to choose C I . Using the indifference conditions in (9) and (10), one can identify ranges of n 2 I in which each of the four equilibria may be resulted. Figure 3 illustrates the results. The initial parameters are
.9, o = 0.5 and s = 0.8. In Figure 3 , the solid lines represent the two indifference conditions and n 2 I is taken as the percentage of residents in C I . The area lying below the two lines give the corresponding ranges of n 2 I such that P 1 would choose C I and P 2 would choose C
; the area above shows the ranges in which P 1 chooses C II and P 2 chooses C I . These two lines divide the plane into three regions. In region I, P 2 chooses C II ; in region I and II combined, P 1 chooses C I ; therefore, in region I one would observe both persons clustering with their similar. In region II, however, P 2 chooses C I ; hence, one would observe both P 1 and P 2 living in C I . Finally, in region III, P 1 chooses C II while P 1 chooses C I -that is, the model predicts completely mixed communities.
The dotted lines in panels (b) to (d) in Figure 3 show the comparative statics. In panel (b), the gain in property value is increased by 0.2. The figure shows that as the gain in property value increases, both indifference conditions shift downward. As a result, the size of region I decreases at the expense of region II; meanwhile, region IV emerges, which reflects the case when both P 1 and P 2 live in C II . Panel (c) shows the comparative statics when s increases by 0.2 to 1.0 and panel (d) increases o to become 0.7. In panel (c), both lines shift upward; in panel (d), both shift downward. Notice that in all three figures, a critical mass exists for n 2 I (1), which is at around 50 percent. When n 2 I increases beyond this critical mass, P 1 has no incentive to choose C I due to the large externality cost associated with the presence of L 2 in C I .
Discussion
The model uses SIT as a framework to show that residential segregation by language identity depends on the size of the in-group and the out-group, the self-identity cost as an out-group member, the externality cost due to the presence of an out-group, and the gain in indirect utility, plausibly in the form of capital gain from the property. The model predicts that when the capital gain from the alternative property is high or when the cost of self-identity is low, individuals are motivated to move and mingle; however, when both the cost of self-identity and the externality due to the presence of an out-group are large, individuals are likely to cluster with their majority group. Essentially, language segregation represents the outcome of a tradeoff between capital gain and the net cost of identity, net cost being the self-identity cost (with he/she being an out-group member) less the externality cost (with he/she being an in-group member). The theoretical considerations imply four testable hypotheses regarding the mobility of language groups. First, population changes of a language group in a neighbourhood depend on its initial size-that is, group size matters to group members. Second, population changes of a language group depend on changes in property values in the neighbourhood. This dependence is positive-that is, population mobility reacts to positive changes in property values. Third, population changes of a language group are associated with the simultaneous mobility of the other language group in the same neighbourhood; if identity matters, the model predicts a negative and significant association. Fourth, identity as a social attribute in a neighbourhood would be capitalized into property values. The next section tests these hypotheses empirically.
IV. The empirical model
The setup
The four hypotheses imply that the empirical model would be a system of three simultaneous equations: an equation modelling changes in property values and two other equations, each specifying the mobility of the two language groups. The three equations are set up as below. The basic estimating equation for changes in property values ΔP is as follows:
All the β's are model parameters and ε is the error term. Note that Δ represents changes in the variables rather than their levels. Variables in boldface are endogenous. The empirical model focuses on changes rather than levels, for two reasons: this specification would be consistent with the theoretical derivation in the preceding section; and focusing on changes would control for the possibility of omitted fixed effects that might be correlated with independent variables, a situation that produces biased model estimates. Explanatory variables include changes in each of the two language groups (ΔL 1 and ΔL 2 ), the physical characteristics of the neighbourhood, the socioeconomic characteristics of the neighbourhood and factors affecting the supply of dwelling units. Controlling for the supply is important: Hilber and Mayer (2004) show that the rate of property capitalization is greatly affected by the segment (and the elasticity) of the supply curve on which the local market operates.
To examine the mobility of the two language groups, the model consists of a pair of mobility equations:
The π's and τ's are the parameters; ν and ξ are the residuals. Changes in the size of a language group are associated with changes in property values in the neighbourhood and in the size of the other language group; they also depend on the initial size of the corresponding language group and the physical characteristics of the neighbourhood.
Three notes follow. First, the system of three simultaneous equations is estimated using 3SLS. A detailed discussion on the choice of variables, omitted variables and instruments is included in section 4.2. Second, the model allows one to test the four hypotheses explicitly. The anticipated results are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Changes in the size of a language group depend on its initial size in the neighbourhood. If this hypothesis holds, one expects estimates of π 3 in expression (12) and τ 3 in expression (13) to be significant. If identity matters, one expects a positive estimate, implying that language group sizes tend to grow at an increasing rate.
Hypothesis 2: Population changes have a positive relationship with changes in property values. If this hypothesis holds, one expects positive and significant estimates for π 1 in (12) and τ 1 in (13).
Hypothesis 3:
If identity matters, changes in the size of one language group are negatively related to changes in the size of another language group in the same neighbourhood. In this case, one expects both π 2 and τ 2 to receive negative and significant estimates.
Hypothesis 4:
Identity is a social attribute in a neighbourhood that will be capitalized into property values. If this hypothesis holds, estimates of β 1 and β 2 in expression (11) should be positive and significant. There is, however, no a priori reason to believe that one identity has a higher capitalization rate than the other.
Third, the empirical model looks at 10-year changes, including two 5-year separate runs of the model. A 10-year change represents a slightly longer-run situation than two 5-year changes; for this reason, one might expect estimates for β 1 , β 2 , π 1 , τ 1 in a 10-year model to differ from those obtained in the two 5-year models.
The context 4.2.1 Relations to previous empirical studies
Conventional urban studies on residential locations of social groups often focus on the pattern of residential segregation and apply the human ecological model to explain the pattern (Burgess, 1925) ; also, they often focus on segregation by income, race and/or immigration status. 4 Paralleling the development of the human ecological model are alternative explanations for residential segregation and integration. One explanation is that geographic clustering and segregation are defence mechanisms for promoting group interests and protecting the group from out-group hostility (Boal, 1981) .
5 Related to this explanation is the hypothesis that clustered residential enclaves are transitory communities that allow for the formation of ties and institutions connecting to the home country (Ong, 2000) . Other explanations suggest that residential segregation is a geographic expression of discriminatory housing practices (Henry, 1989; Kalback, 1990; Farley, 1995; Teixeira, 1995) . Still others propose that residential segregation is merely a reflection of shared socioeconomic status among individuals and has little to do with identity and ethnic exclusion (Clark, 1986) .
Studies on the geography of residential segregation in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver often focus on the notion of the "urban mosaic" of immigration and ethnicity. The empirical literature is voluminous. Bourne (1989) proposes the "social mosaic hypothesis," arguing that Canadian cities are witnessing an increasing degree of social diversity. Immigrants have become more dispersed geographically, a phenomenon that Bourne (1989) captures in the "dispersed city hypothesis," in terms of the suburbanization of ethnic minority and immigrant groups. The dispersed city hypothesis has been widely tested. Archambault et al. (1999) produce evidence supporting the dispersed city hypothesis using Montreal as an example. Doucet (1999) and Hiebert (1994) lend support to the hypothesis using Toronto and Vancouver, respectively. Despite this wide support for the dispersed city hypothesis, some researchers remain sceptical. They warn that residential patterns in Canada's three largest cities are more than spatial laws: residential patterns among ethnic groups are more than spatial regularities; they might also be related to housing characteristics and neighbourhood environments (Bauder and Sharpe, 2002) . Nonetheless, there seems to be consensus that residential segregation remains prominent in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver but that immigrants and ethnic groups are slowly dispersing throughout the three cities.
The present study complements the existing literature in at least three ways. First, it goes beyond describing the degree of segregation in the three cities; it attempts to provide an explanation within the framework of SIT. It views language as a source of social identity that fuels residential clustering and segregation. In doing so, the study provides a conceptual framework that recognizes cognitive human behaviours: it is human nature to seek a sense of belonging and a sense of comradeship through daily communication. The study positions language identity in the context of residential and economic geography. It models the value of social identity as an attribute that can be capitalized into housing values. Empirically, it also recognizes the endogeneity of residential segregation. Finally, the study applies the conceptual framework of SIT to examine the role of geography and the role of institutions in generating social identity and facilitating residential segregation. The next section describes residential patterns by language groups in the three cities. To build the longitudinal data, the study requires a common geographic unit for all three census years (1991, 1996 and 2001) ; the study chooses the 1991 EAs (EAs based on the 1991 boundaries) as the basic units of analysis. A common geographic unit is required because boundaries of census geographic units change from one census year to another. In 1991 and 1996, census geographic units are defined as EAs. EAs are areas canvassed by census representatives to distribute the census questionnaire, whose boundaries are often affected by field collection methods and therefore change from one census year to another. In 2001, EAs were replaced by DAs. DAs are defined based on blocks with a minimum population of 500. DAs differ from EAs in three ways. First, as areal units, DAs are much smaller and more compact than EAs. Second, as analytical units, DAs have boundaries that are more stable temporally than those of EAs, because they are defined by street blocks instead of ad hoc factors such as field collection methods. Third, because DAs are defined by a minimum population count of 500, they contain fewer cases of suppressed census information compared to EAs. 6 Despite the fact that DAs are generally superior to EAs as units of analysis, the present study adopts the 1991 EAs as a common reference unit and matches the 1996 EAs and the 2001 DAs to the 1991 EA boundaries, for two reasons. First, aggregating smaller units to a broader spatial scale tends to give more reliable estimates than disaggregating larger units to a finer geographic scale. Put differently, variables constructed from disaggregation (from EAs into DAs) are particularly sensitive to the method employed; they tend to be less reliable variables than those that are constructed by aggregation (from DAs to EAs). Second, because EAs have far more cases of suppressed units, disaggregating EAs to match DAs would inflate the number of suppressed units, thereby obscuring model results.
The study areas are the "urban areas" of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (Appendix A). For Montreal, urban areas refers to the amalgamated city of Montreal covered by the 1996 Montreal Urban Community Landuse file; for Toronto, urban areas refers to the amalgamated city of Toronto; for Vancouver, urban areas consist of the census subdivisions of Vancouver, Burnaby and Richmond. Table 2 
Variables and methods of aggregation/disaggregation
The study uses the 1991, 1996 and 2001 census profile series for EAs (1991, 1996) and DAs (2001) to create variables for the analysis. Creation of the variables involves spatial aggregation and disaggregation due to boundary reconciliation. For EAs in 1996 that are exactly matched with their 1991 counterparts, all variables are unaffected by boundary reconciliation. Variable aggregation and disaggregation affect all DAs in 2001; they also affect those EAs in 1996 that involve polygon splits and merges. In these cases, variables are first disaggregated, based on polygon splits, into subsets of the 1991 EAs, and then reaggregated, based on polygon merges, into the 1991 EAs. Methods employed for aggregating and disaggregating a variable depend on the variable's type of measurement. Variables measuring the average for a spatial unit (for example, the mean dwelling value in a 1996 EA) are unaffected by dissaggregation-that is, they are assumed to be uniformly distributed over space such that, after the polygon is split into smaller subsets, the spatial average remains unchanged in the subsets. When the subsets are subsequently reaggregated into the 1991 EA polygon, the output variable is a weighted average, with the weights being the areal proportion (sq. km.) of each subset contributing to the total area of the 1991 EA polygon. In contrast, variables measuring the total for a spatial unit (for example, population count in a 1996 EA) are disaggregated by spatial proportion and reaggregated by simple summation. This method preserves the variable's grand total for the study area.
Variables are also created to measure the amount of land for different land uses. For Montreal, landuse data are obtained from the 1996 Montreal Urban Community Landuse file. In addition, 192 elementary schools in Montreal are geocoded by their addresses against the 1991 street network file. Of the 192 elementary schools, 41 are under the purview of the English-language school board and 151 under that of the French-language school board. A distance variable is created, based on straight-line distances; it measures the kilometrage between the centroid of the 1991 EAs and the nearest English school. The school information will be used to test the role of institution in facilitating language identity.
Variables in the present study are grouped under four categories. The first group consists of the endogenous variables: change in population (dPOP); change in median household income (dHHMEDY); change in the proportion of the population whose mother tongue is English (dPEN), French (dPFR), Chinese (dPCH) or other (dPOT); and change in average dwelling value (dVALUE). Dwelling values are values reported by census respondents; they are not market prices. Self-reported values are more relevant and useful than market prices for the present study because they reflect residents' implicit valuation of their community. Market prices, in contrast, are transaction values, reflecting how residents as both vendors and buyers value the property and its neighbourhood.
The second group comprises variables that control for the supply of residential space. This group includes amount of land zoned as vacant (VACANT), residential space (RESI), commercial area (COM), industrial space (INDUS), park area (PARK), other land uses (OLU), and number of new dwelling units built in the last five years (NEW). All variables in this group measure levels rather than changes.
The third group of variables controls for the residential built environment of EAs, including the proportion of single detached dwellings (PSDH), semi-detached dwelling units (PSEMI), row houses (PROW), and others (POUNIT). Other units include apartment units, multiplexes and mobile homes; POUNIT is the default in the model. These are level variables.
Finally, three distance variables are created for analyzing the role of geography and institutions in facilitating and reinforcing language identity in the Montreal sample. The first two variables measure the straight-line distance between the centroid of 1991 EAs and the centroid of the "core cluster" of Anglophones (ENDIST) and Francophones (FRDIST). "Core cluster" is defined as the EA with the largest proportion of a particular language group. In the case of the Francophone core cluster, the core cluster is the EA located near Côte-Saint-Luc. For Anglophones, it is located in the eastern end of Montreal (to the east of Montreal Est). A third distance variable measures the straight-line distance between the centroid of 1991 EAs and the nearest English school (ENSCHDIST). Table 3 describes the variables and Table 4 Second, the literature on household sorting suggests that the socioeconomic and demographic variables are endogenous. Ideally, one would take into account the endogeneity of all demographic and socioeconomic variables in an EA, using instrumental variables. Econometrically accounting for this endogeneity is problematic. The problem lies in the fact that one could hardly find exogenous variables that are highly correlated with the full set of demographic and socioeconomic variables, which do not appear in at least one of the mobility equations. Owing to a lack of instruments, the model here includes only one socioeconomic variable, namely changes in median household income. 9 The variable PEN in 1991 appears in the dPEN equation and not others; likewise, the variables PFR and PCH appear in the dPFR and dPCH equations, respectively, and not others. The variable VACANT is included only in the dVALUE equation; VACANT is assumed to affect the potential increase in supply of residential land and units, but this variable does not affect the mobility decision of the language groups. For the endogenous variable DHHMEDY, the model uses as the instrument the 1991 proportion of residents with university education.
Third, in Montreal, the two language groups considered are Anglophones and Francophones because English/French language issues are a source of longstanding controversy in the province of Quebec. (Section 4.4 provides a brief discussion in the context of school provision.) In Toronto and Vancouver, the two language groups are English and Chinese. The Chinese language is chosen because it forms the second-largest language group in both Toronto and Vancouver. The model is also tested using the second-and the thirdlargest language groups (Portuguese and Italian), and the results are generally comparable. (11), (12) and (13) are estimated simultaneously by 3SLS. The results are discussed below. Dependent variables include dPEN, dPFR (Montreal only), dPCH (Toronto and Vancouver only) and dVALUE. The variable that describes changes in median household income, dHHMEDY, is treated as endogenous using the instrumental variable approach. All other variables are exogenous. Table 5 shows the 3SLS estimates for the 10-year period, 1991-2001; results for the two 5-year periods, 1991-1996 and 1996-2001 , are included in Appendix C.
General results
Consider the mobility equations. For the Montreal sample (panel (a)), the variable RESI receives insignificant coefficient estimates in both mobility (dPEN and dPFR) equations; PARK receives a negative and significant estimate (at the 10 percent significance level) in the equation for the French-language group (dPFR). This result suggests that positive changes in the Francophone population tend to occur in EAs zoned with fewer park spaces. The dPEN equation receives a positive and significant estimate for PSDH, meaning that positive changes in the Anglophone population tend to occur in EAs with larger proportions of singledetached housing units. Both the dPEN and dPFF equations receive positive and significant estimates for PSEMI but negative estimates for PROW. This result implies that both language groups increase in EAs with more semi-detached housing units but decrease in EAs with more row housing.
Consider the property value equation, dVALUE. The variable dHHMEDY receives a positive and significant estimate-that is, in EAs with positive increase in median household income the average housing values also increase. For each percentage point increase in median household income, average dwelling value increases by 0.13 percentage points. All variables that describe the built environment in an EA receive insignificant estimate except PROW. Positive changes in average dwelling values occur mostly in EAs with larger proportions of row houses.
Panel (b) shows the corresponding results for Toronto, 1991 Toronto, -2001 . Both the dPEN and dPCH equations receive significant estimates for most variables that describe the residential built environment. PARK receives negative and significant estimates in the two mobility equations: increases in the size of both language groups tend to occur in EAs with fewer park spaces. RESI receives negative and significant estimates in the dPEN equation; this result suggests that increases in the English-language group tend to occur in areas with mixed uses. EAs with larger proportions of single-detached (PSDH) and semi-detached (PSEMI) dwelling units are associated with a greater increase in the two language groups. Increases in the Chinese-language group tend to occur in EAs with more row houses (PROW).
9 I estimated the model with a full set of demographic and socioeconomic variables, using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) technique. Results are available upon request. I also attempted to estimate the full model with all possible exogenous variables; the results were unsatisfactory, with extremely low R-squared. 10 Results are available upon request.
For Toronto, the dVALUE equation receives a positive and significant estimate for the variable dHHMEDY. For each percentage point increase in median household income in an EA, the corresponding average dwelling value increases by 1.88 percentage points. This result stands in contrast with the result for the Montreal sample, where average dwelling value increases at a rate that is only one tenth of the rise in median household income. A plausible reason for this difference is the political instability experienced in Montreal in the mid-1990s, which caused a plunge in housing prices; using data from a 10-year period smoothes the dwelling values and the impact of incomes on housing values. On the other hand, Toronto experienced a recession in the early 1990s but recovered from the real estate boom by 2001. The change in dwelling values in Toronto between 1991 and 2001 might have picked up the two end-points in the business cycle.
The property value equation receives mostly insignificant estimates for variables that describe the built environment of an EA. VACANT is the only variable that receives a significant coefficient estimate, which is also negative; this result suggests that average dwelling values tend to decrease in EAs with larger proportions of vacant land.
Panel (c) reports the results for Vancouver. Variables that describe the residential built environment receive insignificant estimates, except PSDH and PROW. In both mobility equations, EAs with larger proportions of single-detached dwelling units (PSDH) tend to be associated with larger increases in the two language groups. On the other hand, EAs with larger proportions of row houses (PROW) are often associated with decreases in the two language groups.
For Vancouver, the property value equation shows that increases in average dwelling values tend to occur in EAs with positive changes in median household income (dHHMEDY). For each percentage point increase in median household income, the average dwelling value increases by 0.18 percentage points. This result is close to that reported for the Montreal sample, which suggests that the average dwelling value increases at a rate slower than the rise in median household income.
RESI receives a negative and significant estimate in the property value equation. Property values decrease by a greater magnitude in EAs with larger amounts of land zoned for residential use. PSDH, PSEMI and PROW receive positive and significant estimates: values tend to increase in areas with more singledetached dwellings, semi-detached dwellings and row houses.
Testing the hypotheses
The results reported in Table 5 allow one to test the four hypotheses discussed in section 4.1:
Hypothesis 1: Initial size of a language group Hypothesis 1 tests the condition that changes in the size of a language group are dependent on the initial size of the group. A positive estimate would suggest an external benefit due to group identity. For the Montreal sample, note that the Francophone population (in the dPFR equation) receives a positive and significant estimate for the variable that describes its initial size (PFR); the Anglophone population (in the dPEN equation) receives a negative estimate. This result suggests that group identity matters more to the French-speaking than to the English-speaking population. The negative coefficient estimate for PEN in the dPEN equation might be a reflection of Anglophones' out-of-province migration due to the political turmoil in the mid-1990s.
In Toronto, changes in both the English-language and the Chinese-language populations are sensitive to their respective initial size. This result is reflected in equations dPEN and dPCH, in which the variables PEN and PCH receive significant estimates. For the English-language sample (in the dPEN equation), the variable PEN receives a negative estimate; however, PCH receives a positive estimate in the Chinese mobility equation (in the dPCH equation). This result implies that the English-language group grows at a decreasing rate while the Chinese-language group increases at an increasing rate; it suggests that group identity matters more to the Chinese-language than to the English-language group.
The results for Vancouver are similar to those for Toronto. Both the dominant language group (English) and the minority language group (Chinese) receive significant estimates for the variable that describes the initial size of the group. In particular, PEN receives a negative estimate, meaning that the English-language group grows at a decreasing rate; PCH receives a positive estimate, implying that the Chinese-language group grows at an increasing rate. This result suggests that group identity matters more to the Chinese-language group than to the English-language group.
Hypothesis 2: Mobility and property values
Hypothesis 2 posits that population changes are positively related to changes in property values-that is, population mobility might be driven by gains in property values. For Montreal, as shown in Table 5 , panel (a), the variable dVALUE receives positive and significant estimates in equations dPEN and dPFR but the magnitude of the estimates in the two equations differ. The French-language group is twice as sensitive as the English-language group to changes in property values. For each percentage point increase in the average dwelling values in an EA, the French-language group increases by 0.11 percentage points, whereas the English-language group increases by only 0.06 percentage points.
The Toronto sample obtains different results. In both mobility equations, dPEN and dPCH, changes in the size of the language group are not significantly related to changes in average property values-that is, dVALUE receives insignificant estimates in both equations.
In Vancouver, changes in the size of the two language groups are sensitive to changes in property values. The variable dVALUE receives positive and significant estimates for both the dPEN and the dPCH equations. The magnitudes of the estimates in the two equations are also similar: for each percentage point increase in average dwelling values, population increases by 0.02 percentage points for both the Englishlanguage and the Chinese-language groups.
Hypothesis 3:
The externality cost of identity Hypothesis 3 posits that if identity matters, population changes in one language group will be negatively related to population changes in another language group in the same EA. For the Montreal sample, both language groups are sensitive to the mobility of members from the other language group. The variable dPFR receives a negative and significant estimate in the mobility equation for the English-language group (in the dPEN equation)-that is, in EAs where the French-language population increases, the English-language group decreases in size. For each percentage point increase in the size of the French-language group, the Englishlanguage group decreases by 0.38 percentage points. A similar result holds for the French-language population (in the dPFR equation): the variable dPEN receives a negative and significant estimate. The French-language group is almost 2.5 times more sensitive to the presence of "the other," compared to the association relationship observed among the English-language population. For each percentage point increase in the English-language group, the French-language group decreases by 1.01 percentage points.
For the Toronto sample, both language groups are sensitive to the presence of "the other." For the English-language group, a one percentage point increase in the Chinese-language group is associated with a 1.17 percentage point decrease in the size of the English-language group. The Chinese-language group is far less sensitive to the presence of the English-language group. For each percentage point increase in the English-language group, the Chinese-language group decreases by 0.40 percentage points.
The results for Vancouver are similar to those for Toronto. Both language groups are sensitive to the presence of "the other." A one percentage point increase in the Chinese-language group is associated with a 1.11 percentage point decrease in the size of the English-language group. The Chinese-language group is slightly less sensitive to the presence of the English-language group. For each percentage point increase in the English-language group, the Chinese-language group decreases by 0.80 percentage points.
Hypothesis 4: Language identity and capitalization into property values
Hypothesis 4 posits that identity is a social attribute in a neighbourhood, which is capitalized into property values. Consider the Montreal sample. Panel (a) in Table 5 shows that both dPEN and dPFR receive positive and significant estimates in the dVALUE equation. The estimates imply that increases in both language groups are associated with higher property values. The magnitude of this increase is similar for the two language groups: it increases by 1.61 and 1.19 percentage points, respectively, for the English-language and the French-language groups.
The results for Toronto are different. Both dPEN and dPCH receive insignificant estimates in the dVALUE equation, a result suggesting that language identity has an insignificant impact on how residents value their properties in an EA.
The results for Vancouver are similar to those for Montreal: dPEN and dPCH receive positive and significant estimates in the dVALUE equation. For each percentage point increase in dPEN, dVALUE increases by 0.14 percentage points. The variable dPCH has a greater impact: for each percentage point increase in the Chinese-language group in the EA, property values (dVALUE) increases by 0.43 percentage points-three times greater than the estimate for dPEN.
Discussion
The results described above can be summarized in the following four observations. 1. In general, mobility is related to the built environment of a neighbourhood, with neighbourhood being approximated by an EA. This result is consistent with the urban mosaic literature: in addition to factors related to social support and housing affordability, residential clustering or segregation is related to preferences for the built environment.
2. Changes in incomes and changes in dwelling values are positively related; however, the magnitude of this positive relationship differs for the three study areas. The difference in magnitude can be explained by the fact that property values and incomes are both tied to the business cycle. The three cities are affected by the business cycle in different ways because the composition of their economic activities differs. 11 The different economic activities might have enabled the three cities to weather the business cycle in slightly different ways; therefore, incomes and housing values might have risen or dropped by different magnitudes.
3. In Montreal and Vancouver, language identity is seen as a social attribute that increases property values. In Toronto, however, language identity does not significantly contribute to changes in property values.
4. The results show that language identity matters: The presence of the same language group has a positive externality to the majority language group (French) in Montreal and the minority language group (Chinese) in Toronto and Vancouver; however, the negative externality due to the increase in "the other" has a negative externality on the minority language in all three case studies.
These results are interesting in light of the fact that the French-language group is the majority in Montreal and the Chinese-language group is a minority in Toronto and Vancouver. This majority-minority divide suggests that language identity and positive externality through residential clustering might have much less to do with the status of the group (majority versus minority) than with other factors that affect the way in which language identity is reinforced or enhanced. These factors could include geography and government policies on language-based activities such as education. The subsequent sections will use Montreal as an example to illustrate the role of geography and the role of education policy in influencing language identity.
The spatiality of language identity
To examine the geography of the (externality) cost of identity, the model is rerun for the period 1991-2001 to address the question Is the impact of an out-group who live near an in-group the same as the impact of an outgroup who live further away? Specifically, is the externality cost (due to the presence of an out-group) reduced as members of the in-group live further away? It treats the coefficient of dPFR (dPEN) in the Anglophone (Francophone) mobility equation as a function of the distance to the centre of the core English (French) cluster-that is, it examines the extent to which the externality cost due to the presence of an out-group might diminish as residential distance from the core cluster increases. The core English cluster is the EA that shows the highest concentration of Anglophones in 1991, which is located in Côte-Saint-Luc. Similarly, the core French cluster is the 1991 EA that has the largest proportion of Francophones, which is located slightly to the east of Montreal Est.
For simplicity, geography is assumed to exert a fixed effect on the cost of language identity; no random effect is added to the model. The distance variable is assumed to enter the model in terms of its influence on the parameters π 2 and τ 2 in equations (12) and (13). Specifically, the model assumes that π 2 = γ 0 + γ 1 ENDIST and τ 2 = ω 0 + ω 1 FRDIST. This assumption materializes to an additional interaction term, ENDIST x dPFR, in the Anglophone mobility equation and the term FRDIST x dPEN in the Francophone mobility equation. The interpretation of the parameters γ 0 and γ 1 is that γ 0 measures the average level of sensitivity of the Anglophone population in an EA to a change in the Francophone population. The parameter γ 1 measures the extent to which this average level of sensitivity might increase or decrease with each kilometre separating the EA from the core Anglophone cluster. Similar interpretations apply to ω 0 and ω 1 : ω 1 measures the extent to which the sensitivity increases or decreases with each kilometre separating the EA from the core Francophone cluster. It is expected that γ 0 and ω 0 will receive negative estimates, reflecting the externality cost of language identity. If geography matters for language identity, one would expect γ 1 and ω 1 to receive positive and significant estimates, meaning that the degree of negativity (reflected in γ 0 and ω 0 ) lessens the distance between where the out-group members live and where the core cluster of the in-group lives. Put differently, language groups are more reactive to the presence of the out-group in areas where in-group members are particularly clustered. Language identity is strongest in the core. Table 6 shows the results of the model. Note that most estimates are similar to those reported in Table  5 , and the discussion is not repeated here. Table 6 shows that geography matters to the English-language group, as is evident in the positive and significant estimates for the coefficient of ENDIST x dPFR. On average, for each percentage point increase in the Francophone population, the Anglophone population in an EA decreases by 0.47 percentage points; however, this decrease slows down when ENDIST increases, meaning that in EAs that are further away from the core Anglophone cluster, the decrease in the Anglophone population occurs at a slower rate. For each kilometre outward from the core cluster, the decrease slows down by 0.01 percentage points.
Geography has a slightly greater impact on Francophone identity. The coefficient estimate for FRDIST x dPEN receives a positive and significant estimate. On average, for each percentage point increase in the Anglophone population, the Francophone population drops by 1.04 percentage points; as distance from the core Francophone cluster increases, the drop slows down by 0.02 percentage points.
Institutional factors: Language school boards
To what extent do institutions reinforce language identity (institutions referring to government policies on language-based activities)? This section explores the provision of linguistically based schooling and its role in influencing language identity in Montreal. It begins with a brief history of the language conflict in Quebec in terms of the school system. 12 It then establishes the empirical model, based on section 4.3, and tests the extent to which linguistically based schooling might influence residential clustering of language groups in Montreal.
The language conflict
By the late 1950s, the French-language population was the dominant group in the province of Quebec; however, the group saw its majority status threatened. The threat was partly due to the shrinking size of the Francophone population because of a declining birth rate and partly due to the growing Anglophone population because of a rise in the number of immigrants, who tended to integrate into the Anglophone community. As a response to the threat, the Francophone population demanded a more French Quebec by eliminating parents' 12 The education system in Quebec can be broadly divided into four sectors: elementary and preschool, secondary, college, and university. Elementary education begins at age six and includes six years of schooling, consisting of three cycles of two years each. Secondary education comprises five years of schooling consisting of two cycles: cycle one lasts for three years, during which time students take compulsory subjects; cycle two lasts two years, during which time students can add optional subjects. At the end of their five-year secondary education, students are awarded a secondary school diploma (SSD), which provides access to college, CEGEPS, which is an intermediate level between secondary and university education. At present, Quebec has 50 public CEGEPS and 21 private, subsidized colleges, which provide two years of preparatory courses leading to university education. The present study focuses on the elementary level.
At the elementary and secondary levels, the system comprises both public and private institutions that come under the purview of the provincial ministry of education. Public schools come under the direction of either a French or an English school board. Quebec has a total of 72 school boards, of which 60 are French, 9 are English and 3 are special-status boards serving the indigenous population. In addition to public schools, some 230 private institutions in Quebec provide instruction at the preschool, elementary and secondary levels. freedom to choose the language of schooling for their children. 13 Francophone nationalists demanded that the government require all immigrants to attend French schools, while Anglophone and immigrant groups petitioned for assurances of their right to English-language schooling. In 1969, pressed between the two groups, the Union Nationale government of Jean-Jacques Bertrand passed Bill 63 (Loi pour promouvoir la langue française au Québec). Bill 63 promoted the use of French instruction in English schools and gave immigrants access to French classes to facilitate their integration into the Francophone community. 14 In 1974, the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa passed Bill 22, which declared French the sole official language of Quebec and established the Régie de la langue française to monitor the implementation of Bill 22. The Bill affected every facet of daily life-for example, it established French as the official language of all contracts and required that corporations adopt a French name, advertise primarily in French and communicate with employees in French. In terms of education, however, Bill 22 preserved parents' freedom to choose the language of instruction for their children and provided for the existence of an English-language education sector, although it restricted enrolment in English schools to children with a demonstrated knowledge of English. In essence, Bill 22 abolished the province's policy of bilingualism.
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The misfortunes of the Liberal Party led to the passage of Bill 101 by the Parti Québécois government of René Lévesque in 1977. Bill 101 confirmed the French language as the official language of Quebec in every respect. English schooling was restricted to those already enrolled in the English school system, their siblings, and children whose parents were temporarily posted to the province or whose parents had attended English elementary school in Quebec. The last restriction was later relaxed, so that English schooling was accessible to children whose parents received English instruction in Canada outside of Quebec. Bill 101 was essentially the foundation for today's linguistic and school enrolment policies. In June 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down a unanimous decision confirming the constitutionality of Bill 101. In 1997, Quebec's National Assembly adopted the Charter of the French Language stating that all children must be educated in French until the end of their secondary schooling, whether in a public or a subsidized private school.
16 Eligibility for English schooling was restricted to permanent residents of Quebec who qualified for a "certificate of eligibility," which was available only to children who themselves or whose siblings or parents had completed most of their elementary studies in English in Canada.
Denominational versus linguistic school boards
Schools became the political arena, hosting the conflicts between the Francophone and Anglophone populations. The creation of linguistic boards evolved from a denominational school system dating back to 1867 when Quebec entered Confederation. The 1867 Constitution Act (section 93) guaranteed the protection of the denominational school rights of Quebec's Roman Catholics and Protestants; these two Christian denominations served as the cleavage, dividing Quebec's school system into Catholic and Protestant boards. Until the 1930s, the Church assumed supervisory power in the provision of education. By the mid-1950s, the number of immigrants who were neither Catholic nor Protestant had grown significantly and the French-English linguistic divide sharpened politically. The divide added to the pressure on Quebec's denominational education system and rendered much of the Church's power ineffective.
A proposal to transform the system from a denominational to a linguistic basis emerged in the mid1960s in the report of the Parent Commission, part of a series of reforms intended to restructure Quebec's education system in order to give the government a greater role. 17 In 1964 came Bill 60 establishing the 13 The conflict heightened in 1968 in the Montreal suburb of St. Leonard when the local school board, dominated by Francophone nationalists, issued an order eliminating English-language instruction in its schools. This order produced riots within the Italian community, whose members made up almost half of St. Leonard's population. 14 However, it fell short of Francophones' demands without implementing linguistic policies in terms of school allocation. It recognized the right of parents to have their children educated in the language of their choice. Bill 63 not only produced an outcry from the Francophone community in Quebec but was instrumental in the disappearance of the Union Nationale government from the political area. 15 As an attempt to please both language groups, Bill 22 failed. The Liberal Party was abandoned by Anglophones in the 1976 election and Bourassa resigned as party leader. 16 However, the Charter did not apply to Quebec's colleges and universities or to non-subsidized private institutions. 17 The 1960s period in Quebec is often referred to as the Quiet Revolution. It led to a series of changes in the education system, including equal access to education throughout the province. In 1961, the provincial Ministére de l'Education and the Conseil Supérieur de l'Education as the main authorities in the provision of education. Despite these changes, Quebec's schools remained denominational because of the protection of denominational rights afforded by section 93 of the Constitution. In 1965, the province launched Operation 55 and created 55 regional boards for Catholic schools and 9 for Protestant schools. Denomination and language were the main issues plaguing the Quebec education system in the 1970s. Most changes in the 1970s increased the roles of the public and the government in the education system while diminishing the role of the Church. 18 It was not until 1988 that the new Bill 107 was passed. The resulting Education Act created linguistic boards officially; however, it constitutionally preserved the right of denominational minorities to dissent-that is, religiously affiliated schools could break off from an existing board and form a separate one. For this reason, although linguistic boards were provided for in the new Education Act, this reform could not plausibly be implemented.
In the mid-1990s, the Commission for the Estates General on Education revisited the idea of linguistic boards. The Parti Québécois government of Lucien Bouchard sought and won an amendment to the Constitution. Bill 109, passed in 1997, finally allowed for the implementation of linguistic boards in Quebec. On July 1, 1998, the province's 137 Catholic and 18 Protestant school boards were replaced by 60 Frenchlanguage and 9 English-language boards.
Expanding the empirical model
In light of the language conflict and the school system in Quebec, this section broadens the previous empirical model by examining the question What is the role of the language of schooling in influencing language identity and residential clustering? An extension is added to the model in 4.3 by adding a variable to capture the distance between each EA centroid and its nearest English-language school. This variable, ENSCHDIST, measured in kilometres, is assumed to enter the model as fixed effects. Again, geographic distance is measured by the straight-line method between EA centroids and the school's street address. It is assumed that ENSCHDIST influences language identity in terms of its effect on π 2 and τ 2 in equations (12) and (13). Using the setup as in Section 4.3, the parameter π 2 is expressed as a linear function of geography and school distance, with π 2 = γ 0 + γ 1 ENDIST + γ 2 ENSCHDIST. This assumption implies that an additional crossed term, ENSCHDIST x dPFR, would enter the model. In a similar fashion, it is assumed that τ 2 = ω 0 + ω 1 FRDIST + ω 2 ENSCHDIST, adding the crossed term ENSCHDIST x dPEN to the dPFR equation. Note that the model does not create a separate distance variable for French schools because they are uniformly distributed over the urban area to serve the school catchments; uniformity gives little variation in the distance variable. The parameters γ 2 and ω 2 estimate the extent to which proximity to English schools may diminish or intensify the reaction of a language group to the presence of the out-group. If institutions such as schools do serve to influence language identity, one would expect the coefficient of ENSCHDIST x dPFR to receive a negative and significant estimate in the dPEN equation-that is, the English-language group is least sensitive to the presence of the out-group when Anglophones are close to English schools. Put differently, the Anglophone group clusters around English schools and is less willing to move away even when out-group members increase in number in the neighbourhood. Table 6 , panel (b), reports the results that include ENSCHDIST as fixed effects in the mobility equations. Schools matter to the English-language population. Consider the dPEN equation. The coefficient for dPFR measures the average change in the Anglophone population in an EA when the Francophone population in the same EA rises; the coefficient of ENSCHDIST x dPFR measures the extent to which the average change in the Anglophone population might increase or decrease with each kilometre distant from the nearest English school. The coefficient of ENSCHDIST x dPFR receives a negative and significant estimate (at the 10 percent level), meaning that when an EA is close to an English school, Anglophones are less reactive to an increase in the Francophone group. For each kilometre distant from the nearest English school, the Anglophone population drops by an additional 0.04 percentage points for each percentage point increase in the Francophone group. Anglophones are more mobile with respect to increases in the number of Francophones, government's Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education played a key role in the restructuring process. The commission was headed by Monsignor Alphonse-Marie Parent and is often referred to as the Parent Commission. 18 For example, Bill 27, passed in 1971, provided for the election of school commissioners through universal suffrage and for the formation of school and parent committees.
The results
as Anglophones live further away from English schools. On the other hand, changes in the Francophone population are insensitive to the proximity to English schools, a result that is expected. These results indicate that the identity among Anglophones might be associated with institutional activities such as language schools.
V. Conclusion
The present study examines the cost and spatiality of language identity, language identity being defined as social identity based on language (mother tongue). On the theoretical front, the paper uses SIT as a framework to explain why language groups might cluster by residential location. It also applies the framework and establishes an economic model to lend insights into the residential choice of language groups in light of externality due to identity. The economic model shows that residential location is an outcome of a tradeoff between the externality of identity and the gain in indirect utility due to capital gain in dwelling value. The study also sets up an empirical model with three simultaneous equations. The empirical model uses Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver as case examples to test the extent to which language identity matters and the extent to which language identity is capitalized into dwelling values. It further uses the case of Montreal to examine the role of geography and the role of institutions such as the provision of linguistically based schooling in influencing language identity.
The study focuses on English-language and French-language groups in Montreal and English-language and Chinese-language groups in Toronto and Vancouver. There are four major findings. First, changes in the size of a language group depend on its initial size-that is, cluster of a language group exerts an external benefit due to in-group identity, a benefit reflected by the fact that populations grow at an increasing rate. This external benefit is particularly prominent among the French-language group in Montreal and the Chineselanguage groups in Toronto and Vancouver.
Second, language identity is a neighbourhood attribute that can be capitalized into dwelling values. In EAs that are more homogeneous by language group, average dwelling values tend to be higher, particularly in Montreal and Vancouver.
Third, on the one hand, residential (de)clustering of a language group is driven by the external cost due to the presence of an out-group in the same EA. In Montreal, the French-language group-the majority-is sensitive to the presence of members from the English-language group; in Toronto and Vancouver, changes in the size of the Chinese-language group-a minority-in an EA are also negatively related to changes in the size of the English-language group. On the other hand, the mobility of language groups is also driven by economic concerns about gains in property values, particularly in Montreal and Vancouver. In Montreal, the mobility of the French-language population is twice as sensitive as that of the English-language group to changes in dwelling values. The mobility of language groups in Toronto seem to be less sensitive to changes in dwelling values. In the context of SIT, this result suggests that language identity matters but that its reinforcement might depend on exogenous forces, such as capital gains in dwelling values.
Fourth, geography (in terms of distance) matters as a reinforcement of language identity, as shown by the case study of Montreal. The impact of externality cost due to the presence of an out-group diminishes as distance from the core cluster increases. Put differently, in-group members are more sensitive to the presence of the out-group when the population of the in-group is more densely clustered; as one moves away from this concentration, the impact exerted by the presence of an out-group is reduced. The role of geography or distance in reinforcing language identity is more prominent among the French-language than the Englishlanguage group in Montreal. To the English-language group, however, institutions in the form of proximity to English schools lessen the impact of identity cost. In EAs that are close to English schools, members of the English-language group are much less sensitive to the presence of the French-language group.
These results provide two tentative but important implications that warrant further research. First, to what extent does homogeneity in the residential built environment contribute to residential segregation by language group? In a hypothetical situation wherein all dwellings are identical, capital gains in all dwellings would also be the same, creating zero incentive for language groups to move. In an environment wherein all housing units are different, capital gains in dwellings differ, giving rise to opportunistic behaviour and creating incentives for members of a language group to move and mingle. This hypothetical situation leads one to question the implication of our contemporary suburban developments, which have given rise to large tracts of homogeneous housing. To what extent is this development implicitly encouraging residential segregation in an unanticipated manner?
Second, government social and economic policies are active instruments in "monitoring" households' residential location. Regulations related to the provision of English-language schools have a profound impact in terms of households' residential pattern. These regulations influence clustering based on language, by constraining households' accessibility to education opportunities in terms of children's journey to school and parents' commuting pattern. This observation leads one to wonder about the extent to which residential segregation is an (un)intended outcome of active social policies.
In sum, contemporary research on segregation has revealed much about the degree of segregation on a variety of bases-social status, income, immigration status, race, ethnic, health-and about the implications of segregation for areal-based policies and the provision of services. Much has yet to be explored and discovered regarding the underlying causes of segregation. To what extent is segregation part of our cognitive behaviour-our human nature-in terms of identity-seeking? To what extent is residential segregation an unintended outcome of the way the market has constructed the residential environment? To what extent is it an outcome of government policies and regulations? What are the implications of areal-based social policies? Are these policies creating an unintentional "circular effect," reinforcing segregation and thereby necessitating further areal-based policies? These are serious questions that merit scholarly attention. 
